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Summary  findings
Panagariya and Findlay analyze the welfare effects of  Under a customs union, the tariff available to one
regional integration  in a model of endogenous  country becomes available to all countries in the union.
protection.  This introduces a free-rider problem in lobbying and all
They show that introducing  preferential trading  leads  lobbying takes place in one country.
to an increase in protection  against countries outside the  The lobby chooses a lower (common) externa! tariff
preferential trading  area. Moreover, the  important  under a customs union than under a free trade area. This
Meade result of preferential trading breaks down in the  means that welfare in the country where lobbying takes
presence of endogenous protection.  place is higher under a customs union than under a free
According to the Meade result, if excess demands  trade area, although the same may not hold true for the
exhibit net substitutability, the introduction  of  other country. The level of the common external tariff
preferential trading  is welfare-improving.  In the presence  declines as the number of members in the union
of endogenous protection,  because preferential trading is  increases.
accompanied by increased protection against  Therefore, the larger the number of partners in a
nonpartners,  its effect on welfare is ambiguous.  customs union, the more likely it will improve the
Panagariya and Findlay also compare free trade areas  welfare of member countries. But, because of the free-
and customs unions. They provide the first formal  rider problem, lobbies are likely to resist the enlargement
treatment  of the argument that a customs union is a  of the customs union.
more effective instrument for diluting the power of
interest groups than  is a free trade area.
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and
Ronald Findlay
Columbia UniversityFollowing  Viner's (1950) lead, trade theorists have generally  treated trade policy as
exogenous  in evaluating the welfare effects of preferential  trading arrangements. The general
approach has been to start with a tariff distorted  equilibrium  and ask whether a particular set
of preferential tariff reductions between  union partners is welfare-improving  for each
participating  country, the union and the world as a whole.'
The recent revival of regionalism  around the world, particularly  the North American
Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA), has led trade theorists to take a fresh look at the theory of
regional economic integration. Today, the world trading system is far more complex than
that represented in the stylized, Vinerian  models. An important dimension  of this complexity
is  the endogeneity  of trade policies. 2 In most countries, trade policies are the result of
complex  interactions  between the government  and interest groups.  Sometimes, governments
themselves  are not benign, welfare maximizing  entities and pursue objectives  other than
welfare maximization. This endogenous  nature of trade policy, richly analyzed in a large
number of contributions  under the rubric of "political  economy of trade policy," has
important implications  for our understanding  of regional  economic integration. 3
'For instance,  see Meade  (1956),  Lipsey  (1960),  Berglas  (1979),  Riezman  (1979),  and Lloyd
(1982).
2Another  dimension,  not  emphasized  in this  paper, is the increased  interdependence  of different
regional  arrangements.  Today,  the world  is dividing  almost  simulaneusly into  a few  large  trading
blocs. This  means  that regional  arrangements  can no longer  be analyzed  in isolation  as has been  the
case  with  much  of the Vinerian  literature. Krugman  (1991)  and Deardorff  and  Stern  (1991)  provide
models  of trading  blocs  which  emphasize  this interdependence.
3Among key contributions  to this literature  are Krueger  (1974),  Brock  and Magee  (1978),
Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  (1980)  and  Findlay  and  Wellisz  (1982). Two  book-length  treatments  of the
subject  are Magee,  Brock,  and  Young  (1989)  and Hillman  (1989). Grossman  and  Helpman  (1993)
and Melo,  Panagariya  and Rodrik  (1993)  analyze  endogenous  policy  formulation  in models  of
regional  integration.  Of these,  as noted  below,  the latter  is more  directly  relevant  to the present
paper.In this paper, we reconsider the theory of preferential  trading and customs unions in a
model of endogenous  trade policy.  We address three key questions: (i) What are the likely
implications  of the introduction  of preferential  trading for trade policies towards third
countries? (ii)  How does our conventional  understanding  of the welfare economics  of
preferential trading change when we allow for endogenous  trade policy? (iii) How do free
trade areas (FTAs) and customs  unions (CUs) compare  when tariffs on third countries are
deternined endogenously?
We analyze these questions in the three-good,  three-country  Meade model with the
modification  that trade policy is determined  endogenously. We demonstrate  that the
introduction  of preferential trading has the effect of raising protection  against imports from
the rest of the world.  This result captures an important  aspect of the political economy of
free trade areas.  As has been suggested by Bhagwati  (1993), FTAs can lead to a more
vigorous implementation  of anti-dumping  laws against  third-country  suppliers.
More broadly, NAFTA may have restricted the ability of the United States to make bold
offers for liberalization  at the GATT in products exported  by Mexico.
Our second result concerns Meade's original result on preferential  trading.  According
to this result, the introduction  of preferential  trading is welfare improving  provided the
imports from the union partner exhibit substitutability  with respect to exports.  Because
preferential trading leads to increased  protection against  nonpartners, this key result breaks
down in the presence of endogenous  trade policy.
Finally, we demonstrate  that in general, the FTA and CU cannot be ranked uniquely
with respect to welfare.  Because there is a free-rider problem in lobbying under a CU, the
2common  external tariff under this arrangement  is lower than that in the higher-tariff  country
under the FTA.  But the common  external tariff is likely to be higher than that in the lower-
tariff country under FTA.  It follows that the country with lower tariff under FTA can be
worse off under a CU.  As the number of partners in the lunion  grows larger, the free-rider
problem becomes  worse, the common  external tariff declines, and the likelihood  that welfare
is higher under a CU than under an FTA rises.
To our knowledge, the only paper closely related to ours is that by Melo, Panagariya
and Rodrik (1993). Using a model borrowed from the "rules versus discretion" literature of
macroeconomics,  these authors consider the effects of regional integration on welfare.  There
.are-two countries in the model.  In the initial equilibrium, a policy variable is determnined  in
each country through a game between the national government  and a private lobby.  Regional
integration  replaces  the national government  by a regional authority and the policy variable is
determined  at the regional  level.  This leads to a free-rider problem of the type mentioned  in
the previous paragraph. Because we employ the standard general-equilibrium  model, our
analysis is in the spirit of the traditional international  trade literature and allows a richer
treatment  of preferential  trading in the presence  of endogenous  trade policy.
The paper is organized  as follows. In Section 1, we reformulate  the Meade model
making trade policy endogenous. In Section 2, we analyze the effects of preferential trading.
In Section 3, we compare FTAs and CUs.  Concluding  remarks are offered in Section 4.
Before we begin, it may be noted that following  the standard practice in the literature
on economic  integration,  our analysis is cast in terms of tariffs.  But tariffs should be viewed
as representing  protection  resulting from various trade policy instruments  such as voluntary
3export restraints, anti-dumping  actions, and other mechanisms. We are aware that tariff
increases  are generally  rules out by the GATT bindings. Therefore, when our model
predicts any tariff increases, they should be viewed  as increases in the level of overall
protection  rather than tariffs  M se.
1.  The Meade Model with Endogenous Trade PGI;CV
Let there be three countries, A, B and C and three goods, 1, 2 and 3.  By
assumption,  each country exports one good and imports  the other two.  We let goods 1, 2
and 3 be export goods of A, B and C, respectively. A and B are potential  partners in a
regional arrangement and C represents the rest of the world.  A and B are small in relation
to C such that the terms of trade are determined  in C.
We outline the equilibrium in country  A in detail.  Equilibrium  in country B can be
outlined  symmetrically. The role of country  C is simply  to absorb any excess demands and
supplies from A and B at the fixed terms of trade.  Each good is produced  using a sector
specific factor and a common factor.  The factor specific  to sector i (i =  1,2,3) is labeled
"sector i capital"  and that common  to all sectors is referred to as labor.  Output, capital and
labor in sector i are denoted Xi, K., and Li, respectively. Each good is produced via a
conventional  constant-returns-to-scale  technology,
(1)  Xi  = Fi(Ki,  L)  i  = 1, 2,  3
where a bar over a variable is used to indicate that the variable is fixed.  Goods 2 and 3 are
imported  and good 1 is exported by A.  We choose the units of goods in such a way that the
4world price of each good is 1.  Denoting  by ti the tariff on good i, the domestic price of
good i is 1 +  t,.  Because A exports good 1, we have t,  = 0 and t2,  t3 >  0.  Acting
competitively  in the goods and factor markets, firms in sector i choose Li to maximize profits
given by (1 +  Q)  Fi (Ki, Li) - wL;. The outcome is a profit function gri  (1 +  t4, w)  which is
linear homogenous  in its arguments. Moreover,
(2)  ic,  (1  + ti, w) = F,(K,, Li)
(3)  ic  (1  + ti, w) =  -L 1
Where 7.( ) and w4 ) deniote  partial derivatives  of TirQ)  with respect to the first arguimeint  and
w, respectively.
In (2) and (3), we have 6 equations in 7 variables Fi( ), Li and w.  Adding the full-
employment  constraint, we can obtain an exactly determined  system of equations.  We can
then study the effects of exogenous  changes in tariffs induced by the introduction  of
preferential trading.  This is the standard  Meade exercise.
Our objective is to make tariffs endogenous,  however.  To accomplish  this in a simple
way, we employ the lobbying function  introduced  by Findlay and Wellisz (1982) with the
simplification  that labor is the only factor used in lobbying.  We write
(4)  t=  (I  - ad)gi(1,)  g1(0) = 0,  gi >,  <  < 0;  0  s  at  s  1
where li is the amnount  of labor used in lobbying  in sector i and a, is a shift variable whose
role is explained later.  No lobbying  is permitted in sector 1, the exportable, so that (4) holds
Sfor i = 2,3.  The level of lobbying  is chosen so as to maxijniLe  the ruturn to the sector-
specific factor.  That  is to say, lobbyists maximize 7r' [1 +  (1 - aj) gi (I),  w] - wl, with
respect to li.  This yields the first-order  condition
(5)  (1 - ai) gj' (lj) 1ril  O  = w
where g' 1(l)  is the derivative  of g, ()  with respect to li.  Recalling that 7T, ()  =  F  ()  =X,
the left-hand side of (5) can be interpreted  as the revenue generated by employing  an
additional  unit of labor in lobbying  or the marginal revenue product (MRP 1) of lobbying.
The right-hand side of (5) is the marginal cost of lobbying. Thus (5) says that lobbyists
equate the marginal revenue and marginal cost of lobbying. Note that we assume that
lobbyists take the wage rate as given.  This is a standard assumption  in models of lobbying.
The second-order  condition associated  with the lobbyists' problem requires that the
marginal revenue product of labor given by the left-hand side of (5) be negative function of
1,. That is to say,
a  (MRP)  2  1
(6)  '  i  Si  = O  - Uj)gi (lj)C(  )  + [0  - gigo]  X1(0  < °
The first term on the right-hand side is negative  while the second term is positive.
Therefore, the right-hand side is not automatically  negative.  In the following,  S, will be used
to denote the expression on the right-hand  side of (6).
We can now introduce the full employment  constraint:
6(7)  L  + L2 + L  + 2 +13 = L
where L is the total endowment  of labor.
The model for country A is now fully specified. Imbedded  in equations (2) - (5) and
(7), we have 11 equations in 11 variables, Li, Fi (=XJ), 12,  13, t2,  t3 and w.  We can specify
country B's model analogously  with the modification  that it exports good 2 rather than 1.
Before we proceed to introduce  preferential  trading, it is useful to rewrite the model
in a more compact form.  For this, we first define  the profit function
(8)  R(1+t, 1 ,1l+t3;w)  - 7r (1  +tylw)
Alternatively, R( ) can be derived by maximizing  E(1  (tI)  F,(K,,L)  - wL,  with respect to
Li.  Essentially, R( ) is the total return to specific  factors before subtracting  the
WAx$enditures  on lobbying.
We denote by R,( ) the first partial of R( ) with respect to the ith argument for i =  1,
2, 3.  The first partial of R( ) with respect to w is denoted Rk().  By analogy, Rj,() and R,j
denote the second partials of R( ).  In view of (8), we have
3
(9)  Rj(-)  I 7r,( );  R,,( )  =-i  E  7r.( )
ilI
Recall that the 7ri(  ) are linear homogeneous and strictly convex in their arguments.
Therefore, R( ) will also be linear homogeneous  and strictly convex in its arguments.  The
strict convexity implies that the RiQ()  and RW() are positive.  Furthermore, given that R( )
7is separable  in the I+t,  as si.own in (8), we have R1 j( ) = 0 for i;j  (i, j=1,  2, 3).  The
remaining  cross partial, R1 w(  ), being equal to w'l(),  is negative.
In view of (9), the envelope properties  (2) and (3) are replaced by
(2')  Ri( ) =  F 1 (=  X 1)
(3')  R.(-)  - (LI +  1-2 + 1L3)
We can also replace (S) by
(S)  (I -ai)  gi' (I*)  Ri( )  - w
Our system now consists of 9 equations--three  in (2'), one in (3'), two in (4), two in (5') and
one in (7).  These equations  can be solved for nine cndogeiious  variables, L,  + L 2 + L3, 12,
13,  t2,  t3,  X;  (i  =  1,  2, 3) and w.  The newly introduced  profit function in (8) makes the
model more compact--and  subsequent  comparative  statics less cumbersome--by  replacing  L,,
L2 and L 3 by a single variable, LI + L2 +  L3. The former can, in principle, be recovered
from (1) once we have solved for the Xi.  For completeness,  note that the second-order
condition associated  with the lobbying equilibrium,  (6), should now be written
(6')  Si * (1 -ai)g/'(lj)Rj( ) + [(I -aj)g!(lj)]2 Rii(  )  <  0.
2.  Preferential Trading
We now introduce preferential  trading between A and B.  In the traditional  models of
preferential trading, this is done by lowering intra-union  tariffs exogenously. In our model,
tariffs are endogenous. Therefore, the essence of preferential  trading must be captured
8through an institutional  change which shifts the lobbying function for the good imported from
the partner country, good 2, down such that for the same level of lobbying a lower tariff is
realized. This is accomplished  by shifting  a2 up holding C3  constant.  Without loss of
generality, we can set a2 = a3 = 0 at the initial equilibrium.  Differentiating  (3'),  (4) and
(5') for i =  2, 3, and (7) totally and evaluating  at a2 =  a3 =  0, we obtain
(10)  RW 2dt2 + Rw 3dt  + Rw,dw  - -d(L,+L2+L3)
(11)  dt2 = g2dl 2 - g2da2
(12)  dt, = g3
1d1 3
(13)  -[w  + g2g2'R,2] d% 2 + S2dl 2 = (1 -g 2 R2 w)dw
(14)  S3dl 3 X (1-g 3 R3w)dw
(15)  d(L,+L 2+L3)  + dl2+d1 3 =  0
In deriving (13) and (14) from (5'), we have substituted  t; in terms of li using (4).  This is
why there are no dtj terms in these equations. Solving  the two equations  for d1 2 and d1 3, we
obtain
(13')  d1 2 = _  [(1 -g 2'R 2w)dw  + (w+9g 2g9R2)da2
S2
(14')  d1 3 = +  (1-g93R 3w)dw
3
9Substituting  these into (11) and (12) and the resulting  expressions  into (10), w_ have
d(L +L,+L 3)  =  -R.2  [S  I -g2R 2 )dw  +  2gR22)dY2)-g2dQ2
(16)
- 5g 3 (1 -g3R3.)dw  - R,wdw
53
We can now substitute  (13'), (14') and (16) into (15) to solve for dw/da2.
(17)  [1  (  1g'R)  1  gR3)2  1  R  d  1  (1  g  )  - g2Rw
(17)  .g 2 / 2  T3~  3~)  Rw  da,  T,=  -. (W  +9 2g92R2 2)  92R,)  92FW
Given S2, S3 <  0, Ri, >  0, R,, <0,  and  g'  > 0,  equation (7) leads to dw/da 2 <  0
unambiguously. That is, the introduction  of a preferential  trading arrangement  leads to a
reduction in the wage rate.  Intuitively,  the increase in a2 reduces the incentive  for lobbying
in sector 2.  Because lobbying activity uses only labor, there is a direct reduction in the
demand for labor.  In addition, there is an indirect reduction in the demand for labor due to
a decline in protection to good 2.  Both effects contribute  to a decline in the wage rate.
Combining  (12) and (14'), we have
(18)  dt 3 =  93 (1  )dw
da,  S3 2
Given our result that the wage rate declines  in response to the introduction  of preferential
trading, this equation implies  that the latter leads to an increase in t3. Thus, we have the
interesting  result that trade liberalization  vis-a-vis  the partner country is accompanied  by
10increased  protection against  the rest of the world.  Reduction  in opportunities  to lobby
against one trading partner makes lobbying  against the other partner more attractive.
Assuming  that goods 2 and 3 are close substitutes, this result captures the spirit of
Bhagwati's (1993) fears regarding  pernicious  effects of FTAs on trade policies towards third
countries.  To quote him:
"Imagine  that the United States begins to eliminate  (by outcompeting)  an inefficient
Mexican  industry once the FTA goes into effect.  Even though the most efficient
producer is Taiwan, if the next efficient United States outcompetes  the least efficient
Mexico, that would be desirable trade creation...
"But what would the Mexicans  be likely to do?  They would probably start AD
actions against Taiwan, which would lead to reduced imports from Taiwan..."
If we think of A, B and C as Mexico, U.S.A. and Taiwan and of goods 2 and 3 as textile
products imported from B (United  States)  and C (Taiwan), respectively, our result is in close
confornity with this example.
The effect of the introduction  of preferential  trading on t2 can be obtained formally by
combining  (11) and (13').  We have
(19)  dt=  g2  -g  2/  dw  [2  w  g2  22 '
11In (18), the first term is positive while the second term (including  the negative sign) is
negative. The second term captures the effect of the increase in C%  holding the wage
constant.  This effect lowers t2 by reducing  the marginal revenue product directly as well as
through  a reduction in the output of good 2.  The first term captures the effect on t2 due to a
change in the wage rate.  Because the wage declines, profitability  of lobbying rises solely on
this account.  Of course, stability dictates  that the net result of these two opposite effects be
a decline in t2.
We next turn to the effect of preferential  trading on welfare. Meade's original result
is that if we have t2 =  t3 initially  and the excess demand for good 2 exhibits substitutability
with the excess demand for exportables, the introduction  of preferential trading is necessarily
welfare improving. Intuitively,  an exogenous  reduction in t2 increases the imports of good 2
but may increase or reduce the imports of good 3.  If the imports  of good 3 rise, deleterious
effects of tariffs are reduced in both goods and welfare improves  necessarily. If imports  of
good 3 decline as is likely, however, the harmful effect of distortion in that sector increases.
The question then is whether the loss due to this change is smaller than the gain from the rise
in the imports of good 2.  If excess demands for goods 2 and 1 exhibit substitutability,
exports of good 1 rise in response to a reduction in t2. Given balanced trade, this means that
there is a net expansion  of imports, i.e.,  imports of good 2 expand  more than the decline in
the imports of good 3.  If we now also assume that t2 =  t3 initially, the welfare gain due to
the larger expansion  of imports of good 2 must exceed the welfare loss due to a contraction
of imports of good 3.  On balance, welfare improves.
12In view of the results already derived, it should not be surprising that this important
Meade result mav not hold in the presence  of endogenous  trade policy.  We have already
seen that the introduction  of preferential  trading is accompanied  by increased  protection
against third countries.  Therefore, there is no guarantee  that substitutability  between excess
demands for good 2 and good 1 will be sufficient  to lead to a net expansion  of imports.  The
combined  effect of a reduction in t2 and increase in t3 may well be to reduce total trade.
Moreover, we must take into account  the effect of the introduction  of preferential  trading on
real resources used in lobbying.
In the remainder of this section we present a formal proof of these results.  We
.assume  that preferences can be represented  by a well-defined  social welfare function. We
can then obtain the expenditure  function in the usual way.  The budget constraint or,
equivalently,  the trade balance  condition requires that expenditure  and income be equal.
Letting U denote utility and E()  represent  the expenditure  function, we have
E(1 +t,,  1+t2,  1+t 3 ;  U)  = R(  +t,,  1  +t 2,  1+t3;  w)  + w(L,  +L 2 +L3)
(20)
+  t (E2- R 2)  + t (E3- R 3)
On the right-hand side R()  represents profits plus wage income in the lobbying  activity. The
second term stands for wage income from employment  in productive activity. Finally, the
last two terms represent the tariff revenue assumed  to be redistributed in a lump sum fashion.
Throughout, it is assumed that t, = 0.  In our formulation,  t2 and t3 are endogenous,  but we
keep this fact in the background.
Differentiating  (20) totally, allowing  both t2 and t3 to change, we have
13ZdU  =  -w(dl2+dl3)  + [t,(E2-R 22)  + t3(E,-R.3)]  dt2 + [t(E 3-R2 3)
(21)
+ t3(E33-R 33)]dt,  - [t2R,+t 3R3W]dw
where Z  Eu - t2E2u - t3E3u and is positive as long as all goods are normal.  Recall that R,
=  0 for i  ￿  j  in our specific-factors formulation.  But in general,  they are nonzero.  The
next step is to exploit the zero-degree homogeneity of the Ej()  and Rj()  in prices.  Zero-
degree homogeneity of E,( ) and Rz( ) in prices and the wage allows us to write
(22)  (E21-R, 1)  + (1 +t2)  (E 2 -R)  (1 +t3)  (E23-R23)  - wRp-,  =  0
This,  in turn,  yields
(22')  t2(E22-R22)  + t3(E23  -R 23)  =  +  t-t 3)(E23-R23)  t2(E21- R2I) - t2w R 2 ]
Making use of (22') and an analogous  expression  for t2(E3 2 - R 32)  +  t3 (E33  - R 33), we can
rewrite (21) as
ZdU  =  -w(dl2 +dl3)-(t.2 R 2W+t 3 R 3W)dw
)-  [(t 2 -t)  (E 23 -R23) +t2(E 2 - R2,)  -wt2R2 .Idt.
(21')
-~ 1 +  -t  [(t.  2)  (E 32 - R3 2) +  t (E 31 - R31  - wt, R3W]  dt 3
14Consider first the Meade result.  In the absence of lobbying, 12 =  13  =  0.  If we then lower
t2, holding t3 fixed exogenously  (i.e., dt,  <  0 and dt3 =  0) at t2 t3,  we see that the right-
hand side is positive provided E2I - R21 >  0, i.e.,  excess demands for goods 2 and 1 exhibit
net substitutability. In arriving at this conclusion, we also make use of the fact that the
reduction in t2 lowers w (dw/dt, <  0) and that RK <  0 for i = 2, 3.
Next, suppose tariffs are endogenous. In this case, dt 3 >  0 and d1 2 + d1 3 ￿  0.  We
can no longer ignore the first and the last termn  in (21').  The first term captures the welfare
effect of the change in the overall level of lobbying  activity.  Because  w falls, 13  rises.  But
the decline in the profitability  of lobbying in sector 2 (i.e., the rise in C2)  lowers 12. Thus,
the.,  net effect.  on 12 +  13 is ambiguous. Regarding the last term, if we make the usual
substitutability  assumption--i.e.,  E 3I - R3 >  0--its contribution  to welfare is negative at t2 =
t3. Thus, substitutability  and t2 =  t3 are no longer sufficient  to sign the right-hand side of
(21').
3.  FTA vs. Customs  Union
We now assume that countries A and B have decided to eliminate  trade restrictions
between themselves  but must choose between FTA and CU.  The former allows the external
tariff to be determined  at the national level while the latter requires them to be determined  at
the regional level.  Formally, we can imagine  that under an FTA, tariffs on third countries in
each union member continue to be determined  via the lobbying function introduced in (4),
while under a customs union, an institutional  change requires the determination  of a conmmon
external tariff.
15A key question is how should the lobbying  function be formulated in the case of a
customs  union.  We know that if this choice is made arbitrarily, we can obtain a:iy ranking
of FTA and CU we like.  Therefore, we opt for as neutral a choice as possible. 4 In the case
of a customs union, we write the lobbying function  for good 3 as
(23)  tc = h3(lc)  - h3(13+  13*)  h'  > 0,  h" < 0
where an asterisk is used to distinguish  country B's variables  and superscript c is used to
indicate union-wide  variables under a customs  union.  Accordingly, t' is the common  external
tariff and  IC - 13 + 13.  We assume that the regional institution  is equally responsive  to
lobbying by agents of the two members.  Who invests into lobbying is not important. What
matters is how much.
Under an FTA, lobbying is done at the national  level and tariffs in the two member
countries  may be different.  We write
(4')  FF 
(4 )  t3  =  g3 (13)  t3 =  g3 (13*)
For ease of comparison, we assume that the lobbying  functions  under FTA are identical  in
the two countries.
To maintain  neutrality, we assume that functions  h3( ) and g3 (')  are related with each
other according to
4We draw  heavily  on Rodrik  and Panagariya  (1993)  who, in turn, draw on Rodrik  (1986).
l16(24a)  h3  (13 = 13)  g3 13  |  13 
(24b)  h 3(13  13) <  g 3(1 3 + 13)
According  to (24a), if  13  =  13  =  13  so that the lobbies in each of A and B invest  13
amount of resources, the external tariff under an FTA and CU is the same.  Under an FTA,
we have
F  F
t3=  g3(1  3);  t3 = g3(I3)
and under a customs  union, we have
- -- 23  F  F
t'  = h  3(I 3 +  13)  = h3(213)  93  |  g3(I 3)  =t 3 ,  t3
Thus, lobbying functions  themselves  are neutral with respect to the type of regional
arrangement  chosen.
Another way to compare h3( ) and g3(Q) is that under a CU, if lobbying is done by
agents of a single country, say A, they will have to invest twice as much resources to obtain
a given level of tariff as under an FTA.  Under a CU, the tariff granted to A is also granted
to B.  Therefore, the effort required to obtain  a given tariff is twice as much.  Viewed this
way, it is clear that our formulation  captures the free-rider problem which is often associated
with the formation of a CU.  In policy discussions,  it is commonly  asserted that a customs
union can be an instrument  of weakening  the interest groups seeking protection.  A surrender
17of tariff-making  power to the regional institution  means less influence  of interest groups
within a member nation.
According to (24b), for a given amount of labor employed in lobbying,  the marginal
product of lobbying is higher under an FTA than under a CU.  Equation  (24a) above is not
sufficient to yield this condition.  But the condition  is plausible and is satisfied by function
g3( )  '  Xl  where  3  lies between 0 and 1.
The question we wish to address now is whether FTA and CU can be ranked and
what does this ranking depend on.  To answer, we must first determine equilibrium  tariffs
under the two regimes.  Under FTA, the tariff will be determined  as in the previous section.
Under CU, the problem is trickier.
Protection is a private good under an FTA.  But under a CU, it becomes  a public
good subject to the free-rider problem.  As we demonstrate  below, this feature yields the
usual outcome associated  with the private provision of public goods:  Only the "most
desperate" buyer chooses to pay for it while the others choose to free ride. 5
Consider the problem of the lobby in country A.  Its problem is to maximize
13 [1  +  h 3 (13  +  13'),  W]  - w1 3 with respect to 13  taking w as given.  Recall that 7i3(.)  was
introduced  in Section 1 in the context of equations (2) and (3).  At the optimum, the
marginal revenue product of 13 must be larger than or equal to the marginal  cost of 13. That
is,
'For a review  of the literature  on private  provision  of public  goods,  see Comes  and Sandler
(1986). Also  see Hillman  (1989,  1991)  and Ursprung  (1990)  in this context.
18(25)  h'(lW) w  [1  +  h3 (l1),  W] > w
where  I'  13 +  13'  is the total amount of labor employed  in lobbying.  An analogous
condition  can be written for country B's lobby.  The question then is whether (25) and this
condition  for B's lobby can simultaneously  hold as equalities.  The answer is that only by a
sheer coincidence  is this possible. Treating (25) as an equality, we can determine  I3  as a
function of w.  Likewise, the condition for B gives us another equation determining  l3I as
a function of w',  the wage in B.  It is unlikely  that the two equations will yield the same
value of  I  c.
To explain what is going on here, assume that the wage is constant in each country.
For example, we could assume that the exportable  in each country (i.e., good 1 in A and
good 2 in B) uses only labor.  We can then represent the marginal revenue product of 13
given by the left-hand side of (24) as a function of  li  alone.  This is done in figure 1.  By
virtue of the second-order  condition  this curve, labeled mrp, is downward-sloped. The wage
is labeled  w.
19Next, draw country B's marginal revenue product curve.  Suppose it lies below
country A's curve as shown by mrp'.  If the wage in B lies above w', the lobby in B will
choose to free ride the lobby in country A.  If the wage is below w,  the lobby in B will do
all lobbying and A will free ride.  The reason is that in the former case, for  13' =  0,  A's
best choice is  13  =  and for  13 =  13  B's best response is  13' =  0.  Thus, the
solution  13  =  1  and  13' =  0  is a Nash equilibrium. Analogously,  in the latter case, 13  =  0
and  1  =  I  is a Nash solution.  If the wage in B coincides with w',  the total lobbying will
still be  IC  but how it is divided between A and B is indeterminate.
Observe that given  7r3(-) =  X3 ,  the level of output of the good imported from
country C plays a key role in the determination  of which lobby supplies  the conmmon  external
tariff.  The larger the ratio of this output to the wage rate in a country, the more likely that
lobbying will be concentrated  in that country.  Thus, for instance, given the relative sizes of
import-competing  industries in the U.S. and Mexico, despite the lower wage in Mexico,
20under a customs union arrangement, one will expect the United States to be the "supplier" of
the common  external tariff.
For concreteness,  assume that all lobbying is done in country A.  If we are also
willing to assume now that the exportable  uses only labor so that the wage is the same under
an FTA and CU, following  Panagariya  and Rodrik (1993), a number of additional
conclusions  can be derived.  For example, we can show that the level of lobbying and hence
the tariff is lower under a customs union than that in A under FTA.  The common  external
tariff can, however, be higher than the tariff in B under the FTA.  This means that if country
B happens  to be relatively open under an FTA, it can end up with a higher external tariff
..under.  a customs union.  For instance, in the Mexico-U.S. regional arrangement, Mexico
could end up more protective  under a customs  union than under an FTA. 6 It is interesting
to quote Corden here,
"The broader danger is that thL United States will compel Mexico to impose
restrictions  on imports from Japan and elsewhere  that match the United States' own
restrictions, so as to avoid trade deflection--i.e.,  the direct or indirect import of goods
from outside into the United  States via Mexico if the latter is less protectionist. The
main point is that NAFTA should  aim to be an FTA--a true FTA--but should not
become  a CU, since the latter would lead to Mexico's trade restrictions on imports
from outside being determined  in Washington,  DC."
'Observe  that  we carefully  avoid  the use of the term "higher  tariff' and  use "more  protective"
instead. The tariffs  in U.S.A.  are lower  than  those  in Mexico,  but other  trade  restrictions  such  as
VERs  and anti-dumping  processes  perhaps  make  the U.S. look  more  protective.
21An additional result which may be derived is that as the number of members in the
potential  regional arrangement rises, assuming  that A remains the supplier of the common
external tariff, the level of the extemal tariff declines.  This is because the increase in the
number of members in the union exacerbates  the free-rider problem.  An implication  of this
result is that countries will be better off entering into a customs  union with larger number of
countries than with smaller number of them.  But it also implies that lobbies will likely resist
the enlargement  of a customs union more than of an FTA.
Finally, the welfare ranking of FTA and CU is not unique in general.  Though the
country which supplies the external tariff under a CU is better off under this arrangement
than under an FTA, the other country may be worse off.  This is because the latter may end
up with higher tariffs under a CU than under an FTA.  The larger the number of members,
the more likely that a CU will dominate  an FTA.
4.  Summara  of Results
In this paper, we have analyzed the welfare effects of regional integration  in a model
of endogenous  protection.  We have shown that in this setting, the introduction  of
preferential trading leads to an increase in protection  against countries outside  the preferential
trading area.  We have also demonstrated  that the important  Meade result on preferential
trading breaks down when protection is endogenous. According to the Meade result, if
excess deIs.mands  exhibit net substitutability,  the introduction  of preferential  trading is welfare
improving. In the presence of endogenous  protection, because preferential  trading is
22accompanied  by increased protection  against  non-partners, its effect on welfare is ambiguous.
Benefits  of preferential  trading are counteracted  by increased  pro.ection against outsiders.
We have 21so  compared free .rade areas and customs unions.  Here we have provided
the first formal treatment of the argument  that a customs union is more effective  than a free
trade area in diluting  the power of interest groups.  Under a customs  union, the tariff
available  to one country becomes  available  to all countries in the union.  This introduces a
free-rider problem in lobbying  and all lobbying  takes place in one country.  The lobby
chooses a lower (common) external tariff under a customs union than under a free trade area.
This means that welfare in the country where lobbying  takes place is higher under a customs
union than under a free trade area.  The same need not hold true for the other country,
however.  If that country chooses a lower tariff under a free trade area than the common
external tariff under the customs  union, its welfare under the former arrangement will be
higher.  Finally, the level of the common  external tariff declines  as the number of members
in the union increases.  Therefore, the larger the number of partners in a customs union the
more likely it will improve welfare of member  countries.  By the same token, due to the free
rider problem, lobbies are likely to resist the enlargement  of a customs union.
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